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¿CÓMO SE DICE ‘DUE PROCESS’?: WEIGHING THE ADDED VALUE OF
GUARANTEED INTERPRETIVE SERVICES FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS
Victoria Yuhas*
INTRODUCTION
Isaac Ramos first entered the United States without inspection
approximately thirty years ago.1 He was never formally admitted into the
United States.2 Despite his lack of immigration status, however, Mr. Ramos,
like many undocumented immigrants, has forged ties to the United States3—
he is married to a legal permanent resident4 and has two U.S. citizen
children, along with one U.S. citizen stepchild.5
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University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, J.D., 2020; University of Pittsburgh, B.A., 2015.
Endless thanks to Professors Cary Coglianese, Fernando Chang-Muy, and Jonah Eaton for their
advice and guidance throughout this process. Thank you also to the Journal staff for their revisions.
United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 2010). “Entering without inspection” is a term
of art in immigration law used to describe an entry into the United States that occurs without
inspection by immigration officers. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1) (2018) (“[A]n alien physically
present in the United States who entered the United States without inspection . . . .”).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2018) (“The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an
alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.”).
Profile of the Unauthorized Population: United States, MIGRATION POLICY INST., https://www.migration
policy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/US (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
A “legal permanent resident,” also known as a “lawful permanent resident,” “resident alien permit
holder,” “LPR,” or “Green Card holder,” is “any person not a citizen of the United States who is
living in the U.S. under legally recognized and lawfully recorded permanent residence as an
immigrant.” See Glossary, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/tools
/glossary?topic_id=l#alpha-listing (last visited Jan. 2, 2020); see also Lawful Permanent Residents (LPR),
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/lawful-permanentresidents (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
Ramos, 623 F.3d at 675.
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On May 11, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)6
issued a warrant of arrest and a Notice to Appear,7 charging Mr. Ramos with
removability for commission of a crime involving moral turpitude,
commission of a controlled substance violation, and presence in the United
States without admission or parole.8 On this same day, Mr. Ramos was
transferred to a detention center that at the time of his arrival served as a
transfer point for up to 1500 non-citizen detainees per day.9
At the detention center, deportation officers presented Mr. Ramos with
a form entitled “Stipulated Request for Removal Order and Waiver of
Hearing,” containing statements of waiver written in both English and
Spanish.10 Paragraph 4 of the form concerned Mr. Ramos’s right to an
attorney: “I have been advised of my right to be represented by an attorney
of my choice, at my own expense, during these proceedings. I waive this
right. I will represent myself in these proceedings.”11 Paragraph 5 discussed
a similar waiver of Mr. Ramos’s right to a hearing: “I will be giving up the
following legal rights that I would have in a hearing before an Immigration
Judge: a) the right to question witnesses; b) the right to offer and to object to
evidence; c) the right to require the government to prove my removability.”12
6

7

8
9
10

11
12

The Department of Homeland Security was created in 2002. Most functions previously held by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service were transferred to three DHS components: U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”),
and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). See Did You Know?: The INS No Longer
Exists, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/archive/blog/2011/
04/did-you-know-ins-no-longer-exists (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
Ramos, 623 F.3d at 675. A Notice to Appear (“NTA”) is a document given to a non-citizen
instructing him to appear before an immigration judge on a certain date. See USCIS Updates Notice
to Appear Policy Guidance to Support DHS Enforcement Priorities, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-updates-notice-appear-policy-guidance
-support-dhs-enforcement-priorities (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
Ramos, 623 F.3d at 676–77. These charges under the Immigration and Nationality Act refer to 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (a)(2)(A)(i)(II), and (a)(6)(A)(i) respectively. Id.
Id. at 677.
Id. The stipulated removal regulation permits Immigration Judges (“IJs”) to enter deportation,
exclusion, and removal orders without hearings and in the absence of the parties. 8 C.F.R. § 3.25(b)
(2019). For the argument that the stipulated removal program, as a whole, fails to comport with
the requirements of due process, see generally JENNIFER LEE KOH, JAYASHRI SRIKANTIAH &
KAREN C. TUMLIN, DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS (Richard Irwin ed., 2011), available
at https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Deportation-Without-Due-Process-201109.pdf.
Ramos, 623 F.3d at 677.
Id. “Immigration Judges” are Article II administrative judges. The Attorney General appoints IJs
to conduct specified proceedings within the Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration
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The form stipulated that in signing it, Mr. Ramos would be admitting to
all of the factual allegations contained within the Notice to Appear.13 The
form also specified that Mr. Ramos’s signature would indicate that the entire
document had been read to him in a language that he understood, that he
fully understood the consequences of submitting the form, and that he was
submitting this request for removal voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.14
After distributing the form to Mr. Ramos and a group of other detainees,
an immigration enforcement agent explained the consequences of signing it
via a presentation delivered in Spanish.15 The agent explained that Mr.
Ramos and the other detainees had two options: first, they could accept the
stipulated removal or, second, they could appear before an immigration
judge and seek voluntary departure or permission to remain in the United
States legally.16 The agent also advised the group that, under the stipulated
removal program, they could be removed that day, whereas waiting to
appear before an immigration judge could take two to three weeks.17 The
agent then read the text of the form aloud, also in Spanish, before concluding
the presentation.18
Following this group presentation, a deportation officer met individually
with Mr. Ramos.19 No transcriber, interpreter, or attorney was present at
the meeting.20 The officer conducting the meeting was not fluent in Spanish,
and the extent of her Spanish-language education was limited to “several
classes” she took as part of her training with the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).21 Understanding that Mr. Ramos could not
communicate in English, the officer asked in Spanish what she understood
translated to: “Do you want to fight your case or want to sign?”22 At a

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Review (“EOIR”), including removal proceedings.
See Glossary, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary?topic_id=i#alpha-listing (last
visited Jan. 2, 2020).
Ramos, 623 F.3d at 677
Id.
Id. at 678.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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subsequent hearing attacking the validity of Mr. Ramos’s deportation order,
the court interpreter stated that the statement was “nonsensical in part” and
that she would not know how to translate certain parts of the question.23 Mr.
Ramos signed the document and was removed to Mexico that day.24 When
he later challenged his deportation, the Ninth Circuit found his waiver to be
invalid on due process grounds:
Ramos’s waiver of appeal and of the due process rights specified in the
Stipulated Removal form was not ‘considered or intelligent’ because he did
not receive a competent Spanish language translation of his right to appeal
when he signed the form. ‘It is long-settled that a competent translation is
fundamental to a full and fair hearing. If an alien does not speak English,
deportation proceedings must be translated into a language the alien
understands.’25

Thus, despite having entered the United States unlawfully, Mr. Ramos
was able to benefit from the procedural protections of the Due Process
Clause.26 Those protections guaranteed Mr. Ramos competent translation
services as part of his deportation hearing.
In his case, Mr. Ramos succeeded in invalidating the waiver because of a
settled maxim in immigration law: any persons located within the United
States, whether their entries into the country were legal or illegal, are entitled
to the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.27 The question of
whether someone is “within” the United States in this area of law, however,
does not turn on physical presence.28 Rather, the law focuses on the manner
in which the non-citizen entered the United States’ borders.29 Where a noncitizen, like Mr. Ramos, has come to be physically present in the United
States by way of crossing a border, even unlawfully, that person is considered
to be “within” the United States and, thus, eligible for procedural due-

23
24
25

26
27
28
29

Id.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 680–81. Despite finding the waiver to be invalid, the Ninth Circuit held that Mr. Ramos
could not prevail on a motion to dismiss the indictment because he did not suffer prejudice as a
result of the due process violation. See id. at 683–84 (“INA § 212(h) does not provide relief for aliens
removed for illegal presence in the United States without admission or parole in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) . . . . Whether Ramos would be eligible for a waiver of removal on the
ground of his controlled substance violation is therefore immaterial.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 192 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 187 (majority opinion).
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process protections.30 By contrast, if Mr. Ramos had instead arrived at an
entry point and, out of fear of returning to Mexico, asked if he could enter
and remain in the United States, the same constitutional protections would
not have applied to him.31 This is because asylum seekers are subject to a
legal fiction in which they are treated as if they are “on the threshold” of
entry, even after they are permitted to physically enter the United States to
adjudicate their claims.32 This Comment evaluates the discrepancy between
rights afforded to non-citizens located “within” the United States—that is,
those who have “entered” the country—versus unadmitted non-citizens—
those who are treated as remaining “on the threshold” of entry even if
physically present in the United States.
Absent this “on the threshold” doctrine, it is clear that asylum applicants
would have a liberty interest at stake that would qualify them for procedural
due-process protections. It is settled that due-process protections do not
apply whenever an administrative adjudication33 takes place; rather, the
Clause is triggered only when a protected life, liberty, or property interest is
at stake.34 The Court has stated that a deportee’s right to due process stems
from a liberty interest: “[D]eportation . . . visits a great hardship on the
individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land
of freedom.”35 Once one accepts the reality that asylum seekers, like
30
31
32
33

34

35

Id.
See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”).
Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 187.
An administrative adjudication (as opposed to an administrative rulemaking) is an agency
determination of “particular rather than general applicability that affects private rights or interests.”
JACOB A. STEIN & GLENN A. MITCHELL, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 33.01 (2020). Because the
decision of whether or not to grant asylum is particular to each applicant, it is clearly a form of
administrative adjudication. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(3) (2018) (referring to the asylum determination
process as an “adjudication”).
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972)
(“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. When protected
interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.”). There are
arguments that could be raised in support of the idea that asylum adjudications concern life and
property interests, but those potential arguments are not addressed in this Comment.
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945). In Wilkinson v. Austin, the Supreme Court identified
two sources of qualifying liberty interests: (1) the Constitution, “by reason of guarantees implicit in
the word ‘liberty’”; and (2) an “expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” 545 U.S.
209, 221 (2005). Based on the language in Bridges v. Wixon, a deportee’s right to due process stems
from the first source. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154. There is also a plausible argument under Wilkinson’s
second prong that the asylum statutes create an “expectation or interest.” Though the statutes
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individuals in deportation proceedings, are physically present in, and thus,
striving to stay in, the United States, it becomes difficult to understand why
the same recognized liberty interest would not also be at stake in the context
of asylum adjudications.36
Part I argues that the “on the threshold” doctrine should be invalidated
so that asylum applicants, like deportees, can benefit from the protections of
the Due Process Clause throughout the course of their adjudications.
Sections A through C of Part II conduct a procedural due process balancing
test and conclude that the risk of erroneous deprivation for asylum seekers,
combined with the added value of comprehensive interpretative services,
outweigh any relevant government interests. Finally, Section D of Part II
explores Professor Lucie White’s notion that procedural due-process
principles comprise a commitment to fostering individual dignity. It argues
that failing to provide guaranteed interpretative services to asylum seekers
can deprive them of identity-driven choices that fall within the Court’s
definition of “dignity.”
I. ANYONE PHYSICALLY PRESENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
SHOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS UNDER THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
A. Historical Development
The text of the Due Process Clause does not use the word “citizen”—
rather, the Clause stipulates that “no person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”37 In 1889, however, in the
Supreme Court’s first immigration case, Justice Stephen Field drew a

36

37

contain no provision providing a right to asylum for those who seek it, it seems reasonable for an
asylum seeker to expect to be granted asylum where she fears returning to her country on account
of persecution. Even the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to asylum as a
right for those in this situation. See G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, ¶ 14(1), Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.”).
Although one might argue that the asylum seeker’s interest in staying in the United States is not as
weighty as that of the individual facing deportation, given the one-year deadline, this point is not
relevant to the question of whether the Due Process Clause is triggered. In the first part of the dueprocess analysis, the concern is simply whether the interest is one that is protected at all. Erwin
Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 871, 888 (2016).
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
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distinction between American and foreign persons, holding that Chinese
laborers’ licenses to return to the United States could be revoked at any time
at the Government’s pleasure; in other words, Chinese laborers could be
denied entry to the United States without notice or a hearing.38 The Court
largely grounded its conclusion in the United States’ plenary power39 and
reasoned that the nation’s power of exclusion over foreigners, being incident
to its status as a sovereign state, could not be granted away or restrained on
behalf of anyone.40
Several years later, in 1903, the Supreme Court was faced with a new but
related question: Can an executive officer deport a non-citizen, alleged to be
in the United States illegally, without providing notice or an opportunity to
be heard?41 The Court held that the political branches’ power of discretion
in the immigration context was not so unlimited that they could deport as
easily as they could exclude.42 Although the Court’s opinion reaffirmed the
Government’s plenary power over those who remained “on the threshold,”43
the Court stressed that the Government’s discretionary authority is
nonetheless subject to the constraints of due process.44 The Court reasoned
that non-citizens within the jurisdiction of the United States are persons
38
39

40
41

42
43
44

The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
While the contours of the doctrine have changed over time, the doctrine, in general, states that
Congress and the executive branch have “broad and often exclusive authority” over immigration.
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990).
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609.
See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1903) (“It is contended . . . that in respect
of an alien who has already landed it is consistent with the acts of Congress that he may be deported
without previous notice of any purpose to deport him, and without any opportunity on his part to
show by competent evidence before the executive officers charged with the executive of the acts of
Congress, that he is not here in violation of law; that the deportation of an alien without provision
for such a notice and for an opportunity to be heard was inconsistent with the due process of law
required by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.”).
Id. at 100–01.
This language was used to describe excludable non-citizens in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 100–01. This decision came several years after the Court
held in Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1896), that the government could not
impose criminal penalties on undocumented non-citizens without first providing them with the
opportunity for a judicial trial. Wong Wing concerned a provision of the Geary Act of 1892, which
read: “That any such Chinese person or person of Chinese descent convicted and adjudged to be
not lawfully entitled to be and remain in the United States shall be imprisoned at hard labor for a
period of not exceeding one year and thereafter removed from the United States, as hereinbefore
provided.” Geary Act of 1892, ch. 60, § 4, 27 Stat. 25 (1892).
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within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and therefore, they cannot
be deported without notice and an opportunity to be heard, at a minimum.45
Since these foundational cases, the Supreme Court has continued to
expand the scope of non-citizens’ constitutional rights in several contexts. In
Mathews v. Diaz, the Court clarified that all non-citizens situated within the
United States’ borders are entitled to due-process protections, even where
that presence is “unlawful, involuntary or transitory.”46 In Plyler v. Doe, the
Supreme Court held that undocumented, school-aged children could not be
denied access to a free public education,47 citing the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court construed 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) to include a “reasonable time” limitation on the
Government’s ability to detain non-citizens, reasoning that a statute
permitting the indefinite detention of non-citizens would raise serious
concerns under the Due Process Clause.49
Despite these developments for those situated within the United States’
borders, the Supreme Court has continued to invoke the plenary power
doctrine with regard to non-citizens who have yet to “enter” the nation:
“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far
as an alien denied entry is concerned.”50 In Trump v. Hawaii, decided in 2018,
Chief Justice Roberts echoed this sentiment on behalf of the majority: “For
more than a century, this Court has recognized that the admission and
exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised

45
46
47
48

49

50

The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 100–01.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214–29 (1982).
Id. The Court first held that the Equal Protection Clause applied to non-citizens in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins. See 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution is
not confined to the protection of citizens.”).
Zadvydas v. Davis, 553 U.S. 678, 682, 690 (2001). The provision at issue reads: “An alien ordered
removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C),
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a
risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond
the removal period . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2018). This provision applies to non-citizens within
the United States’ borders. The Court in Zadvydas noted that raising the same issue with regard to
unadmitted non-citizens would present “a very different question.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682. For
a more recent development in this area, see the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision, Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). In other words, courts are
not permitted to review the Government’s decisions in the exclusion context. Id. at 212–13.
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by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial
control.’”51
Thus, the Court continues to hold steadfast onto the idea that a noncitizen “can be paroled ‘into the United States’”—that is, be physically
within the nation’s borders—“and yet not be ‘within the United States.’”52
B. Analysis and Criticism
After World War II, the newly formed United Nations issued a resolution
declaring that all individuals have a right to seek refuge from persecution
outside of their home countries.53 The United States’ Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) defines “refugee” as:
Any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion . . . .54

Under the INA, an “asylee” is someone who meets the definition of refugee
but who is “already present in the United States or is seeking admission at a
port of entry.”55
Asylum seekers “already present” in the United States are entitled to dueprocess rights under current case law.56 Those individuals “seeking
admission at a port of entry,” however, are not “persons” within the meaning
51
52
53
54

55

56

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952)).
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 192 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, ¶ 14(1) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in
other countries asylum from persecution.”).
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018)). The INA leaves “particular social group” undefined.
See id. Recently, Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), made headlines for overruling a
previous Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388
(B.I.A. 2014), wherein the Board had held that “married women in Guatemala who are unable to
leave their relationship” constituted a particular social group. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at
388–89.
Refugees and Asylees, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/immigrationstatistics/refugees-asylees (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). Refugees who are not asylees are simply
referred to as “refugees” under the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018).
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Refugees and Asylees, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/refugees-asylees (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
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of the Due Process Clause and consequently do not benefit from these
protections.57 Although one might not expect American constitutional law
to apply extraterritorially,58 the reality is that the asylum evaluation process
does not take place outside of the United States’ jurisdiction.59 Asylum
interviews are not conducted via microphone and speaker with Officer and
Applicant on opposing sides of a border wall. Rather, asylum seekers are
most often either paroled into or detained in the United States for the
purposes of establishing their claims.60
Asylum seekers who enter into the United States’ without making official
“entries”61 are physically present in the United States but are treated, legally,
but fictionally, as though they are still on the other side of a border wall.62
The adjudications of their asylum claims are conducted on U.S. soil,63 and
applicants may even be permitted to work in the United States while their

57
58
59

60

61

62

63

Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210–12 (1953).
Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008) (examining the extraterritorial reach of the
Suspension Clause).
See Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states
(“To obtain asylum through the affirmative asylum process you must be physically present in the
United States . . . . [f]or asylum processing to be defensive, you must be in removal proceedings in
immigration court with the Executive Office for Immigration Review . . . .) (last visited Mar. 17,
2020).
STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y. WADA, 5 IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 62.01 (Supp. 2011). Affirmative asylum applicants are “rarely” detained. Obtaining
Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (last visited Mar. 17,
2020). DHS’s new policy of returning asylum seekers to Mexico while they await their hearings in
immigration court does not undermine this Comment’s thesis, for those claims are still adjudicated
within the United States with the asylum seeker physically present. Press Release, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen Announces Historic Action to Confront Illegal
Immigration (Dec. 20, 2018), available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/12/20/secretarynielsen-announces-historic-action-confront-illegal-immigration.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2018) (“The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an
alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer . . . [a]n alien who is paroled under section 1182(d)(5) . . . shall not be considered
to have been admitted.”).
See Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 F.3d 704, 717 (6th Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 534 U.S.
1063 (2001) (“Although exclusion proceedings usually occurred at the port of entry, the Supreme
Court developed what has become known as the ‘entry fiction’ to govern the rights of those aliens
who are deemed excludable but who have nonetheless been allowed to enter physically the United
States for humanitarian, administrative, or other reasons . . . . ”).
See generally RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 8.9 (2018–2019 ed. & Supp.
2018).
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claims are pending.64 Nonetheless, because of a line of immigration cases
beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Case,65 these asylum seekers remain, via
a legal fiction, “on the threshold,” and thus, are not entitled to procedural
due-process rights under the U.S. Constitution.66 Yet, for three reasons, this
doctrine of denying due-process protections to asylum seekers who are
physically present in the United States should be invalidated.
First, the Court’s decision in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy67—
which stated that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned”68—was grounded
in a distinction between rights and privileges. This distinction, however, is
no longer relevant to the procedural due-process inquiry.69 Distinguishing
between “rights” and “privileges” was an exercise historically relevant to the
question of whether due process should apply in a given case.70 In the
Supreme Court case Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, for example,
a group of religiously motivated pacifists argued that their university’s policy
of mandating participation in a military training violated their due-process
rights.71 The Court rejected the argument, finding that “refusing to bear
arms” was a privilege, as opposed to a constitutional right.72 Only
constitutional rights, the Court concluded, were covered under the Due
Process Clause.73 The Court later abandoned this rationale when it realized
64

65

66
67
68
69

70
71
72
73

See Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/
refugees-asylum/asylum (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). An asylum applicant may file for employment
authorization if 150 days have passed since she submitted her completed asylum application
(excluding any self-caused delays), and no decision has been made on her application.
The Chinese Exclusion decision has been heavily criticized in legal academia. See, e.g., Louis Henkin,
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 853, 858 (1987) (“[T]he accretions to [the doctrine that Congress has the power to control
immigration] – notably the notion that immigration controls are not subject to the constitutional
limitations applicable to congressional acts generally – cry out for the sharpest criticism.”); see also,
e.g., Robert S. Chang, Whitewashing Precedent: From the Chinese Exclusion Case to Korematsu to the
Muslim Travel Ban Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1183, 1190 (2018) (describing the Chinese Exclusion
Case and Korematsu as products of “flawed jurisprudence”).
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
Id. at 544.
For further reading on the history of this development, see RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, 3 ROTUNDA AND NOWAK’S TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 17.2(a) (5th ed. 2012).
See, e.g., Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 264–65 (1934).
Id. at 262.
Id. at 263–64.
Id. at 264–65.
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that “unless the government were required to accord fair treatment of
individual interests that could not be termed ‘rights,’ there would be almost
no check on the power of government to limit individual freedom in
society.”74
The Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly75 ushered in a new era of due
process in which a wider variety of interests became eligible for constitutional
protection. The Court explicitly rejected the Hamilton rights-privileges
distinction76 and instead turned its attention to whether the complainant had
some sort of property interest at stake. Concluding that the welfare benefits
at issue in that case constituted a form of entitlement, the Court dedicated
the remainder of its opinion in Goldberg to determining whether the existing
procedures comported with the demands of due process.77 In subsequent
decisions, the Court settled on a modern due-process doctrine in which
constitutional protections would be triggered wherever there was some
cognizable life, liberty, or property interest at stake.78
Second, as discussed in the following three Subsections, the plenary
power doctrine that animated the Court’s decision in the Chinese Exclusion
Case: (1) has been abrogated since that decision; (2) was created to be applied
in the context of an invasion; and (3) serves no cognizable purpose where the
foreigner is already physically present within the United States. In the Chinese
Exclusion Case, the Supreme Court reasoned that it may not weigh in on the
Government’s power to exclude because:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States as a part of those sovereign
powers delegated by the [C]onstitution, the right to its exercise at any time
when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require
it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.79

The Court thus held that the judiciary has no authority whatsoever to
restrain the United States when it is exercising its sovereign power of
exclusion.

74
75
76
77
78
79

See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 69, § 17.2(a).
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 (“The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that
public assistance benefits are a privilege and not a right.”) (internal quotations omitted).
For a discussion on this aspect of the Goldberg decision, see infra Part III.A.
See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 69, § 17.2(b).
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
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1. The Plenary Power Doctrine Has Been Abrogated
Supreme Court decisions issued subsequent to the Chinese Exclusion Case,
however, suggest that the Government’s authority over excluding noncitizens can in fact be restrained. After the Chinese Exclusion Case was decided,
the Court issued a series of decisions holding that certain classes of excluded
individuals were entitled to due-process rights. In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,80
for example, the Court held that a lawful permanent resident81 returning to
the United States from a four-month trip on a U.S. merchant vessel was
entitled to procedural due-process protections.82 Later, in Landon v. Plasencia,
the Court expanded this principle to apply generally to lawful permanent
residents’ trips outside of the United States.83 In Chin Yow v. United States, the
Court held that individuals claiming to be citizens were entitled to dueprocess rights at their exclusion proceedings.84 Even in the recent Trump v.
Hawaii case, in which the exclusion policy at issue resembled the contested
statute in the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court did not defer absolutely to the
President’s judgment—rather, it asked whether the exclusion policy was
“plausibly related to the Government’s stated objective to protect the country
and improve vetting processes.”85

80
81
82

83

84

85

Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
A lawful permanent resident is a form of non-citizen. See supra note 4 for additional explanation
of this immigration status.
Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 600. Following this decision, the BIA held that lawful permanent
residents arriving as stowaways would also be entitled to due process protections. Matter of B-, 5
I&N Dec. 712 (B.I.A. 1954).
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 (1982). It should be noted that these protections are not
absolute. The Court mentioned in Plasencia that “extended” trips could result in a loss of this
entitlement. Id. at 33.
Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 12 (1908) (“If one alleging himself to be a citizen is not
allowed a chance to establish his right in the mode provided by those statutes, although that mode
is intended to be exclusive, the statutes cannot be taken to require him to be turned back without
more. The decision of the Department is final, but that is on the presupposition that the decision
was after a hearing in good faith, however summary in form.”); accord Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253
U.S. 454, 464 (1920) (“It is better that many Chinese immigrants should be improperly admitted
than that one natural born citizen of the United States should be permanently excluded from his
country.”).
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018). Interestingly, the Court’s decision did not cite
Mezei or the Chinese Exclusion Case. See generally id. The Court also did not refer to the government’s
authority with regard to exclusion as a “plenary” power. See generally id. The citations explaining
why deference was warranted state only that review on such matters should be “highly
constrained.” Id. at 2419–20 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976)).
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2. The Plenary Power Doctrine was Created for Use in the Context of an Invasion
The policies animating legislative and executive deference in the context
of exclusion largely stem from national security concerns86 and are therefore
inapposite to the case of the typical affirmative asylum seeker. When an
asylum seeker enters (without, of course, “entering”),87 that individual is
either paroled into or detained in the country.88 In the case of affirmative
asylum seekers, most are granted parole.89 The INA authorizes Attorneys
General to use their discretion in determining whether an asylum applicant
should be granted parole. Factors considered include evidence of
“character,” “criminal history,” and “national security concerns.”90 The
status granted to parolees, therefore, informs courts that the Government has
already made at least one security determination and thus, such concerns are
no longer salient, if relevant at all.91
86

87
88
89

90

91

See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (“To preserve its independence, and
give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and
to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated.”).
See supra note 59.
See supra note 60.
See supra note 60. Even DHS’s new policy of returning asylum seekers to Mexico does not appear
to stem from national security concerns but rather a desire to cut down on “illegal immigration and
false asylum claims.”
Humanitarian or Significant Public Benefit Parole for Individuals Outside the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-or-significantpublic-benefit-parole-individuals-outside-united-states (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
Cf. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 602 (1953) (“This preservation of petitioner’s right
to due process does not leave an unprotected spot in the Nation’s armor. Before petitioner’s
admission to permanent residence, he was required to satisfy the Attorney General and Congress
of his suitability for that status. Before receiving clearance for his foreign cruise, he was screened
and approved by the Coast Guard. Before acceptance of his petition for naturalization, as well as
before final action thereon, assurance is necessary that he is not a security risk.”) (footnotes omitted).
President Trump recently declared illegal immigration to be a “national emergency,” describing it
as an “invasion of drugs, invasion of gangs, [and an] invasion of people.” Proclamation No. 9844,
84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 20, 2019); see also Maria Sacchetti, When Trump Declared National Emergency,
Most Detained Immigrants Were Not Criminals, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/when-trump-declared-national-emergency-most-det
ained-immigrants-were-not-criminals/2019/02/22/a332480e-36ad-11e9-a400-e481bf264fdc_sto
ry.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.36e02b5aa7a1 (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). The question of
whether it can fairly be said that those who unlawfully cross the Mexico-United States border are
as dangerous as the President describes them to be is outside the scope of this Comment. Assuming
the President is correct for the time-being, the affirmative asylum seekers who are the subject of this
Comment are not the sort of covert border-crossers discussed in the Presidential Proclamation.
Affirmative asylum seekers actively make their presence known to immigration officials with the
goal of acquiring legal residency status. See infra note 131.

May 2020]

¿CÓMO SE DICE ‘DUE PROCESS’?

849

3. The Plenary Power Doctrine Serves No Cognizable Purpose Where the Foreigner
is Already Within the United States’ Borders
The theory of the plenary power doctrine in the immigration context
rests in part on the idea that the Government must have free rein to exclude
dangerous foreigners from its territory.92 The reality, however, is that asylum
seekers are physically present within the United States’ territory for their
adjudications.93 Any stated governmental need to exclude—particularly, to
exclude so rapidly that due-process protections cannot be afforded—is
irrational in light of the reality that asylum seekers’ claims are adjudicated in
the very territory from which it is said that they must be kept from entering.94
Third and finally, denying due process to non-citizens on U.S. soil is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush. In that
case, the Government argued that the Suspension Clause’s protections did
not apply to non-citizens detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba because the
United States did not officially claim sovereignty over that territory.95 The
Court, finding that the writ was available to the detainees, emphatically
rejected the Government’s formalist approach:
[T]he Government’s view is that the Constitution had no effect there, at least
as to noncitizens, because the United States disclaimed sovereignty in the
formal sense of the term. The necessary implication of the argument is that
by surrendering formal sovereignty over any unincorporated territory to a
third party, while at the same time entering into a lease that grants total
control over the territory back to the United States, it would be possible for
the political branches to govern without legal constraint.
Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. The Constitution
grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and
92
93
94

95

See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
See supra note 59.
Justices Marshall and Jackson dissented in Jean v. Nelson and Mezei, respectively, to demonstrate the
irrational consequences of adhering to the entry fiction. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 874 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[ E]ven in the immigration context, the principle that unadmitted aliens
have no constitutionally protected rights defies rationality. Under this view, the Attorney General,
for example, could invoke legitimate immigration goals to justify a decision to stop feeding all
detained aliens. He might argue that scarce immigration resources could be better spent by hiring
additional agents to patrol our borders than by providing food for detainees. Surely we would not
condone mass starvation.”); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 226–27
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Does the power to exclude mean that exclusion may be continued or
effectuated by any means which happen to seem appropriate to the authorities? It would effectuate
[a non-citizen’s] exclusion to eject him bodily into the sea or to set him adrift in a rowboat. Would
not such measures be condemned judicially as a deprivation of life without due process of law?”).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 753 (2008).

850

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:3

govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply.
Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers are not
“absolute and unlimited” but are subject “to such restrictions as are
expressed in the Constitution.”96

The Court then engaged in a functional analysis in which it concluded
that the United States’ “absolute and indefinite” control over Guantanamo
Bay signaled that, “[i]n every practical sense, Guantanamo is not abroad; it
is within the constant jurisdiction of the United States.”97 The Court’s
language in Boumediene was not narrowly focused on the Suspension Clause
but was rather a sweeping declaration that the United States cannot
determine when the Constitution’s protections apply; ultimately, the Court
held, the Government is restricted by the Constitution wherever it is
exercising sovereignty.98
In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the Court engaged in a formalist
analysis similar to the one Boumediene expressly rejected. In Mezei, the Court
held that a non-citizen who was detained in New York while seeking formal
admission into the United States was not entitled to procedural due-process
protections. The Court explained: “Neither respondent’s harborage on Ellis
Island nor his prior residence here transforms this into something other than
an exclusion proceeding . . . . In sum, harborage at Ellis Island is not an
entry into the United States.”99 In other words, the Court reasoned that the
Constitution’s due-process protections did not extend beyond the sovereign’s
boundaries; the respondent, not having made an official entry into the
United States under the INA, was, under the law, not within those
boundaries.100
Post-Boumediene,101 however, it is clear that the Government cannot
decide (in the exclusion context, via legislation) when and where the
Constitution applies. When INA § 101(a)(13)’s102 legal fiction is out of the
96
97
98
99
100
101

102

Id. at 765 (citing Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)).
Id. at 768–69.
Id. at 765–69.
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213 (citations omitted).
Linda Bosniak, A Basic Territorial Distinction, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 407 (2002).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). In re Ross can in many ways be viewed as a preceding case to
Boumediene. In Ross, the Court held that a British subject serving on an American vessel in Japanese
waters who was being tried before an American tribunal had all of the rights of a similarly situated
American citizen. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 479–80 (1891).
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 167 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2018)).
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picture, it becomes clear that parolees and detainees, being physically present
within the United States for their hearings, are located within sovereign
territory of the United States.103 As such, the entirety of the Constitution,
including the Due Process Clause, applies to them, and no formalist
distinctions concocted by statute can function to exclude them from that
protection.104
III. DUE PROCESS DEMANDS GUARANTEED INTERPRETATION
SERVICES FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS
The procedural due process inquiry consists of two steps: first, courts
must determine if process is due, and second, if that question is answered in
the affirmative, what process is due.105 If not for the “on the threshold”
doctrine, asylum adjudications would trigger procedural due-process
protections. Given the lack of justification for this doctrine, this Part
proceeds to examine the sufficiency of the current procedures afforded to
asylum applicants. It concludes that the current procedures do not meet the
minimum requirements of due process. As long as asylum seekers are not
guaranteed a hearing in their language of choice, they are not receiving an
“opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.”106 To reach this conclusion, this Part conducts a Eldridge balancing
test in Sections B through C and evaluates the current procedures’ effect on
asylum seekers’ dignity in Section D.
103

104

105
106

Unlike in Boumediene, these individuals are not located in areas where the United States Government
denies sovereignty. Instead, the fiction denies that asylum applicants are actually located in areas
where sovereignty is uncontested.
This position, of course, does not exist without criticism. Jon Feere, current Senior Advisor for
ICE, argues that the plenary power doctrine should be retained to ensure that judges do not get
into the business of making political decisions on behalf of the United States. JON FEERE, PLENARY
POWER: SHOULD JUDGES CONTROL U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY? 6 (2009). Quoting the Court’s
decision in Mathews v. Diaz, Feere argues that because immigration decisions “implicate [the United
States’] relations with foreign powers” and because “classifications must be defined in the light of
changing political and economic circumstances,” they are inherently political and should be made
without “judicial interference.” Id. at 5, 7. Due-process protections, however, would not render
the political branches powerless to control the nation’s borders. Much to the contrary, the political
branches would still be the sole bodies responsible for defining the statutory standards as to who
constitutes a security threat and who is eligible for asylum in the first place. Requiring courts to
provide due-process protections for non-citizens seeking entry would simply provide greater
assurance that the decisions made under these politically created statutes are accurate.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 888.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Armstrong
v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
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A. Outlining the Eldridge Inquiry
As previously noted, the Court’s decision in Goldberg widened the scope
of interests available for due process protections,107 but the decision was
seminal for an additional reason. Goldberg, in combination with Mathews v.
Eldridge, introduced a balancing test to determine what process is due in any
given situation:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.108

In both Goldberg and Eldridge, the same issue was before the Court: Was it
constitutionally permissible to terminate the plaintiffs’ government benefits
without first providing them with an opportunity for a hearing?109
In Goldberg, plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to hearings before the
Government could terminate their welfare benefits.110 After the Court
determined that due process of some sort was required—that is, that there
existed a potential loss of property—it weighed the interests of the parties
involved.111 Although the Court in Goldberg did not define the balancing test
with the same level of particularity as it did in Eldridge,112 its reasoning
nonetheless focused on the comparative weightiness of the same two
competing interests: the Government’s interest in preserving financial and
107
108
109

110
111
112

See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334–35 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263–71).
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 255; Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 323. The minimum due process requirements are
notice and an opportunity to be heard. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 69, at § 17.8(i).
However, the hearing need not always involve trial-type procedures to meet the minimum
requirements. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343 (“In view of these potential sources of temporary income,
there is less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary principle . . . that something
less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.”). The focus of
this Comment is on the affirmative asylum process. USCIS provides affirmative asylum applicants
with notice of their scheduled interviews. See Glossary, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-process (last
visited Mar. 17, 2020). As such, my focus is on the sufficiency of procedures provided at the
application and interview stages.
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 255–60.
Id. at 262–63.
The test was made explicit in Eldridge. See supra note 108.
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administrative resources versus the beneficiaries’ interest in not being
erroneously deprived of financial assistance.113 The Goldberg Court
determined that the risk of erroneous deprivation without a pre-termination
hearing outweighed the Government’s interest, and thus, due process
required the availability of a such a hearing.114 Moreover, the Court, in
examining the welfare recipients’ specific needs, concluded that the pretermination hearing would need to be an oral hearing because the average
education levels of welfare recipients, combined with their inability to obtain
professional assistance, would make written argument an unrealistic
option.115 The Court emphasized that procedures must be tailored to the
“capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”116
In Eldridge, by contrast, the Court found that the existing procedures were
sufficient.117 In that case, a Social Security disability beneficiary argued that,
as in Goldberg, due process required the Government to afford him an oral,
judicial-type hearing before his benefits could be terminated.118 The Court
again conducted a balancing test, this time explicitly, to determine the
weightiness of the interests involved.119 The Court concluded that a Social
Security disability recipient’s risk of deprivation was lower than that of a
welfare recipient because eligibility for Social Security disability was not
based on financial need.120 Moreover, unlike in Goldberg, the focus of any
Social Security disability hearing would be on written medical documents—
as such, the Court reasoned, recipients would not derive much added benefit
from the opportunity to present their arguments orally.121 Meanwhile, on
the other side of the balance, the Court found that providing opportunities
for oral hearings would impose additional costs on the Government.122 The
Court concluded that the Government’s interests outweighed the plaintiff’s

113
114
115
116
117
118

119
120
121
122

Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264–65.
Id. at 264–66.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 268–69.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 349.
See id. at 323 (“The issue in this case is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
requires that prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be
afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.”); see also Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 260–61.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343–45.
Id. at 347.
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and, thus, unlike the welfare beneficiaries in Goldberg, the plaintiff was not
entitled to a pre-termination hearing.123
When the Eldridge balancing test is applied to the asylum context—which
is the purpose of Sections B and C of this Part—it becomes clear that the
current procedures afforded to applicants are insufficient to satisfy due
process and that the added value of guaranteeing interpretation services
would outweigh the costs such a guarantee would impose on the
Government.124
B. Existing Asylum Procedures
In the United States, there are two paths through which a non-citizen
can obtain asylum: affirmative or defensive.125 This Comment focuses on
the experience of the affirmative asylum seeker.126 To acquire asylum via the
affirmative process, the asylum seeker must first submit to USCIS a
completed Form I-589, APPLICATION FOR ASYLUM AND FOR
WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL.127 This form is submitted after the asylum
123
124
125

126

127

Id. at 349.
See Part III.C, infra.
Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.
gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (last visited Mar. 17,
2020).
Defensive asylum applications occur in the context of deportation proceedings. Id. As such, the
Court has already found these individuals to be entitled to due-process protections. See supra note
41. In such cases, the non-citizen contests removability by arguing that she is eligible for asylee
status. The IJ hears the case in a courtroom-like proceeding where the individual (with her attorney,
if she is represented) argues against the U.S. Government, represented by an ICE attorney. At the
culmination of the proceedings, the IJ renders a decision regarding the non-citizen’s asylum
eligibility. If the non-citizen is found to be eligible, the IJ orders the asylum granted. Immigration
courts are required under Executive Order 13,166 to provide interpreters for applicants not
proficient in English, though there is evidence to suggest that the EOIR’s current interpretive
services fail to meet the Order’s (technically non-binding) stipulations. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3
C.F.R. § 159 (Aug. 11, 2000); LAURA ABEL, LANGUAGE ACCESS IN IMMIGRATION COURTS 5
(2011).
The
Affirmative Asylum
Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-process (last
visited Mar. 17, 2020). Withholding of Removal is a legal process that is in many ways similar to
Asylum. See 8 C.F.R. 208.16(b)(1)(i) (2019) (“If the applicant is determined to have suffered past
persecution in the proposed country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, it shall be presumed that the
applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened in the future in the country on the basis of the
original claim.”). A notable difference between the two processes is that a grant of asylum enables
the asylee to adjust to resident status, while a grant of withholding does not. See generally Green Card
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seeker has (unofficially) entered the United States as a detainee or a
parolee.128 Asylum seekers must submit the form within one year of their
arrival.129 The form and its accompanying instructions are only available in
English.130 The form asks applicants to describe the source of their fear “in
detail,” among other open-ended questions.131 The form’s instructions
stipulate that “any document containing foreign language submitted to
USCIS must be accompanied by a full English language translation.”132
Applicants are additionally required to submit “reasonably available”
corroborative evidence of their claims.133 The applicant submits the
application by mailing it to the appropriate USCIS office.134
Once the application is complete and submitted, USCIS will schedule
the applicant for an interview.135 USCIS provides applicants with an
interview notice stating the date, location, and time of their asylum
interview.136 An asylum officer conducts the interview.137 The interview is
not intended to be adversarial,138 although the applicant has the right to have
an attorney present “at no cost to the U.S. Government.”139 Applicants can

128

129

130

131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

139

Eligibility Categories, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/green
card/eligibility-categories (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
See STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y. WADA, 1 IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 8.09 (Supp. 2019) (describing what procedures the government may choose to
invoke when an asylum seeker first arrives to the United States).
The Affirmative Asylum Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-process (last visited Mar. 17 2020).
There are several exceptions to this rule. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(3)–(5) (2019).
Instructions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/files/form/i-589instr.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2020). The form is available for download at
https://www.uscis.gov/i-589.
See generally I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/i-589 (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
Instructions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/files/form/i-589instr.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2020).
Id.
Id.
The Affirmative Asylum Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/h
umanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-process (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
Id.
Id.
Appendix 15-2 Non-Adversarial Interview Techniques, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-26573/0-0-0-28729.
html (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
Instructions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/files/form/i-589instr.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2020). Applicants, in other words, are responsible
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also bring witnesses to testify on their behalf.140 The purpose of the interview
is to establish the identity of those present at the interview, evaluate the
applicant’s credibility, and make a determination of the applicant’s eligibility
for asylum.141
In Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, the Southern District of Florida
observed the substantive significance of the asylum interview stage:
While it is true that, if denied by the District Director, the asylum application
may also be presented to an immigration judge . . . there was considerable
evidence at trial that the immigration judge often bases his decision solely on
the administrative record compiled by the District Director and will permit
the applicant to be impeached on the basis of the prior administrative record
if he seeks to bring additional evidence to the attention of the immigration
judge. The evidence adduced at trial tended to show that the immigration
judge’s decision on an asylum application never differed from the local
District Director’s decision. Hence, although it is true that the alien may
resurrect his asylum application before an immigration judge, he must have
asylum from the District Director if he wants to avoid deportation.142

Despite this significance, however, applicants are solely responsible for
providing their own interpreters. If the applicant is not proficient in English,
USCIS requires that the applicant bring an interpreter to the interview.143
Failure without good cause to bring an interpreter where one is needed is
considered a failure to appear to the interview and may result in dismissal of
the application or waiver of the right to an interview.144 In other words, the
existing procedures available to affirmative asylum seekers do not include
guaranteed interpretation services.
C. Applying the Eldridge Balancing Test to Interpretation Services
This Section applies the Eldridge balancing test to determine if the current
procedures available to asylum seekers meet the minimum requirements of

140
141

142
143
144

for finding and paying for their own attorneys. This rule does not distinguish between detainees
and parolees.
Id.
Appendix 15-2 Non-Adversarial Interview Techniques, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-26573/0-0-028729.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F.Supp. 442, 454 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
8 C.F.R. § 208.9(g) (2019). This Code of Federal Regulations provision governs affirmative asylum
applications only. Defensive asylum applicants receive the benefit of 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 (2019).
Id. § 208.9(g) (2019); Id. § 208.10 (2019). Of course, applicants can only understand these
regulations if they speak English or know someone who can translate.

May 2020]

¿CÓMO SE DICE ‘DUE PROCESS’?

857

due process. As noted earlier, the Eldridge test mandates the consideration of
three factors: (1) the asylum seeker’s interests; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation and the probable value of the requested procedure; and (3) the
Government’s interest, including the interest in preserving fiscal and
administrative resources.145 Each factor will be addressed in turn.146
1. The Asylum Seeker’s Interests
Asylum seekers’ interests are in refuge from what they perceive to be
persecution. Thus, much like the plaintiffs in Goldberg, asylum seekers believe
that dire consequences will result if their claims are denied. The United
States compiles statistics on asylum seekers’ claims. In Fiscal Year 2017, the
top countries from which asylum seekers sought refuge were China, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Venezuela.147 The most common bases
for their claims were, respectively, persecution based on religious beliefs,
membership in a particular social group, membership in a particular social
group, “none,”148 and political affiliations.149 If an asylum seeker is unable
to establish persecution on an accepted basis, the applicant will, in almost all
cases, be returned to the country from which she sought refuge.150
Asylum seekers face serious consequences if forced to return to their
home countries.151 A variety of media sources have reported on the
difficulties, and sometimes tragedies, that denied asylum applicants
experience upon returning to the states from which they sought refuge. For
example, one source stated:
145
146

147
148

149
150
151

See supra note 108.
For related due-process-centered commentary on other aspects of asylum adjudications, see
generally Richard F. Hahn, Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 957 (1982) and Nimrod Pitsker, Note, Due Process for All: Applying Eldridge to Require Appointed
Counsel for Asylum Seekers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 169 (2007).
2018 USCIS ANN. REP., at 41, available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
cisomb/cisomb_2018-annual-report-to-congress.pdf.
“None” with regard to Mexico simply means that there was no single majority ground. The second
and third most common grounds Mexican nationals invoked were “membership in a particular
social group” and “political affiliation.” Id.
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(1) (2018).
It is perhaps worth noting that it is technically possible under the INA to remove an individual to a
third country, but, under the Act, the first attempt must always be to remove the denied applicant
to the country from which she came. See Id. § 1231(b)(1)(C) (“If the government of the country
designated in subparagraph (A) or (B) is unwilling to accept the alien into that country’s territory,
removal shall be to any of the following countries . . . .”).
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Immigrants’ rights advocates say credible fear interviews can be a matter of
life and death. “The consequences are dire for people who are turned
around,” says Eleanor Acer, senior director for refugee protection at Human
Rights First. “These people will be returned to persecution without even
having the chance to have their claims for asylum assessed in U.S.
immigration courts.”152

Published accounts from unsuccessful asylum seekers’ families echo the idea
that applying for asylum is, for many, a matter of life and death:
The family believed that Acevedo could convince anyone, even the new
president, that returning to El Salvador meant certain death. The country
had the world’s highest murder rate. Acevedo had already been stabbed
once. “They already kill my friends, and they are going to do the same to
me,” he said, according to his asylum application. . . . He was deported to El
Salvador on Nov. 29, 2017. He disappeared on Dec. 5, 2017, and his body
was later found in the trunk of a car, wrapped in white sheets. An autopsy
showed signs of torture.153

Acevedo’s story is not unique. Another unsuccessful asylum seeker,
Constantino Morales, was also murdered in his country of origin following
his failed attempt to secure asylum in the United States:
Constantino Morales was a cop in Guerrero, Mexico, until he tried to break
up a drug cartel and became a target of violence. He escaped to the U.S.
and worked at a Cheesecake Factory in Des Moines, Iowa, and then became
a popular laborers’-rights advocate. As with Laura, a minor traffic stop led
to his removal, which he initially fought. At a community meeting with Tom
Latham, at that time a Republican congressman, Morales said, “If I am sent
back, I will face more violence, and I could lose my life.” Morales had
applied for asylum a month earlier. He was denied. At the time, the U.S.
State Department called Guerrero “the most violent state in Mexico.” Seven
months after Morales’s deportation, he was shot and killed.154

The benefit sought in asylum cases—that is, the grant of asylum itself—
is, like the welfare benefits that were at issue in Goldberg, granted in response
152
153

154

Joel Rose & Marisa Peñaloza, Denied Asylum, But Terrified to Return Home, NPR (July 20, 2018, 5:17
PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/20/630877498/denied-asylum-but-terrified-to-return-home.
Kevin Sieff, When Death Awaits Deported Asylum Seekers, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/when-death-awaits-deported-asylum-se
ekers/?utm_term=.ead2fae486a1.
Sarah Stillman, When Deportation is a Death Sentence, NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence. Since the June 2018
issuance of Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), it will likely only become more difficult to
establish eligibility for asylum based on gang violence. In Matter of A-B-, a woman sought asylum
to escape her ex-husband’s abuse. Id. at 321. After the BIA found the woman to be eligible for
asylum, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions overruled the decision, stating that the abuse was a
purely “private” crime and thus not a form of persecution. Id. at 317.
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to a perceived dire need, to individuals in desperate circumstances. Upon
denial, the individual faces a serious risk of hardship; in the case of the asylum
seeker, that hardship may include abuse, torture, or even death.
2. Added Value of Additional Procedures and Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second Eldridge factor considers the “fairness and reliability of the
existing . . . procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional
procedural safeguards.”155 Currently, as previously noted, asylum applicants
are responsible for finding their own translators.156 This is an ineffective
procedural safeguard to ensure “meaningful”157 hearings for several reasons.
First, translating is difficult. Although the average applicant may be able to
find a friend158 who knows some English, simultaneous, and even
consecutive, interpretation159 are skills that require significant training to
master.160 Multilingual individuals not trained in the art of interpretation are
often unaccustomed to processing a person’s speech and then producing
exact translations.161 In fact, the process of generalizing people’s speech is
155
156
157
158

159

160

161

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976).
See supra note 143.
See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PM-602-0125.1,
THE ROLE AND USE OF INTERPRETERS IN DOMESTIC FIELD OFFICE INTERVIEWS (2017), available
at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2017/2017-17-1-RoleU
seInterpreters-PM-602-0125-1.pdf (prohibiting legal representatives, witnesses, and minors from
acting as interpreters without good cause and discouraging family members from doing so).
“Simultaneous” interpretation involves translating a person’s speech into English as she is still
speaking in her own language. See Simultaneous Translation, COLLINS DICTIONARY, available at
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/simultaneous-translation (last visited
Jan. 3, 2020). By contrast, “consecutive” interpretation takes place when the translator waits until
the individual has finished speaking to then translate what she has just said. Consecutive and
Simultaneous Interpreting, LANGUAGE MARKETPLACE, https://www.conference-interpreters.ca/
Differences-Consecutive-Simultaneous-Interpreters.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
See DANIEL GILE, BASIC CONCEPTS AND MODELS FOR INTERPRETER AND TRANSLATOR
TRAINING 8 (Rev. ed. 2009) (“At first sight, the ability to understand tests/speeches in the languages
translators and interpreters work from seems an obvious and therefore trivial prerequisite. It is less
clear to the layperson how good this passive knowledge must be. For the ‘lowest’ levels of
interpreting and translation work . . . high-school knowledge of the foreign language can be enough,
but as one moves up toward top-level translation and conference interpreting, requirements also
increase.”); see also LAURA ABEL, LANGUAGE ACCESS IN IMMIGRATION COURTS 6 (2011) (“In
situations where [limited English proficiency] individuals face ‘serious consequences’—such as
deportation—not just any evaluation process will suffice; agencies must provide ‘the highest quality
language services.’”).
See GILE, supra note 160, at 9–10 (“[T]he Translator’s relevant procedural knowledge refers to
‘technical skills’ such as the ability to follow in one’s decision-making the principles governing
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encouraged in foreign language classes.162 Those who become multilingual
“naturally” via being raised in multilingual households adapt a similar
approach as young children.163 All of this is to say that translation is not
necessarily a skill that develops concurrently with second language
acquisition—a friend or legal assistant who is fluent in the target language
but who is untrained in the art of translation likely will not make an effective
interpreter.164 The onus of communicating an asylum seeker’s story should
not fall on such individuals.
Thus, there are at least two ways in which failing to provide adequate
translation services can result in the asylum seeker experiencing erroneous
deprivation. First, the obvious case: where the applicant does not speak
English and does not know anyone who does, USCIS will dismiss that
individual’s application for “failure to appear for the interview.”165 As a
result, even the “prototypical asylum seeker”166 who speaks only Quechua
would have her application dismissed if she is unable to find someone to
translate for her. Second, an applicant who is able to find a multilingual
English speaker willing to act as her translator is still at risk if that speaker is
not trained in the art of translation. Because untrained interpreters are
unlikely to capture every word of the applicant’s, or the interviewer’s, speech,
there is a significant risk that important details will be lost in translation. This
is of special concern in the asylum context where applicants “must provide

162

163

164
165
166

fidelity norms, to use techniques for ad hoc Knowledge Acquisition, for language enhancement and
maintenance, for problem-solving, for decision-making, for note-taking in consecutive, for
simultaneous interpreting, as well as, increasingly so, to mastery of modern translation technology
or the specifics of public service interpreting, audiovisual translation and interpreting, signedlanguage interpreting and localization.”).
See, e.g., UNIV. OF PA. OFFICE OF LEARNING RES., IT’S ALL GREEK TO ME: LEARNING AND
STUDYING IN A FOREIGN LANGUAGE 1, available at https://www.vpul.upenn.edu/lrc/lr/
PDF/foreign%20language%20(W).pdf (“When listening, don’t assume you have to understand
every word. Try to guess the general meaning.”).
See PETER SKEHAN, A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO LANGUAGE LEARNING 14 (1998) (“[L]isteners
use a variety of means to maximize the chances that they will be able to recover the intended
meaning of what is being said to them. They are not, in other words, using some linguistic model
to retrieve meaning comprehensively and unambiguously.”).
See generally ABEL, supra note 160.
8 C.F.R. § 208.9(g) (2019). The regulation provides an exception where the applicant is able to
show “good cause.”
See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 318 (A.G. 2018) (“The prototypical refugee flees her home
country because the government has persecuted her—either directly through its own actions or
indirectly by being unwilling or unable to prevent the misconduct of non-government actors—
based upon a statutorily protected ground.”).
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detailed information” and answer questions “as completely as possible,”167
and where inconsistencies between information provided at the application
and interview stages can prompt findings of incredibility.168
3. The Government’s Interests
Eldridge instructs courts to balance the private interests involved against
the Government’s interests in preserving fiscal and administrative
resources.169 In the Fiscal Year 2017, DHS, which includes USCIS—the
agency that reviews affirmative asylum applications, spent $3,371,007.54 on
litigation-related costs.170 DHS’s overall budget in 2017 was $66,801,948,171
which means litigation-related costs absorbed roughly 5% of DHS’s funding
that year. Thus, the burdens that litigation costs currently pose to DHS
appear to be rather minimal.
Federal courts currently guarantee competent foreign language
interpreters to “ensure that justice is carried out fairly for defendants and
other stakeholders.”172 In that adjudicatory setting, for the highest quality
interpreters, the fee is $226 for a half-day of work.173 Asylum interviews
generally last around one hour, which would fall comfortably within the four-

167
168

169
170

171
172
173

Instructions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/files/form/i-589instr.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2020).
See Sarah Filone & David DeMatteo, Testimonial Inconsistencies, Adverse Credibility Determinations, and
Asylum Adjudication in the United States, 3 TRANSLATIONAL ISSUES PSYCHOL. SCI. 202, 204 (2017)
(“[T]he REAL ID Act of 2005 expanded the rules of credibility determination to allow inconsistent
testimony regarding peripheral details (e.g., dates, non-central aspects of the claim) to sustain
adverse credibility findings.”). Asylum applicants’ testimony is a primary source of evidence for
asylum adjudications. Credibility determinations are thus “central” to this process. Tania Galloni,
Keeping It Real: Judicial Review of Asylum Credibility Determinations in the Eleventh Circuit After the REAL ID
Act, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1037, 1045 (2008).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 434 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES (2018), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/FY%202017%20DHS%20FOIA%20Annual%20Report.pdf (last visited Mar.
18, 2020).
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2016), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2017BIB.pdf.
Federal Court Interpreters, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/federal-court-interpreters (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
Id. For less-skilled interpreters, the fee is $111 for the same amount of time.
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hour limit that constitutes a “half-day.”174 Thus, providing high quality
translation services for the average asylum interview would likely cost
USCIS, at most, around $226, assuming no discount for a work period that
lasts fewer than four hours.175
In Fiscal Year 2018, asylum seekers filed a total of 48,862 affirmative
applications with USCIS.176 If the agency were forced to provide high
quality interpretation services to each and every one of those applicants, the
cost to the agency would have likely been $11,100,668. Thus, even at its
maximum impact, the cost of providing translation services would increase
DHS’s litigation-related costs to $14,471,675.50, roughly 21% of the
agency’s overall budget. Under the next-highest “tier” of interpreter quality,
the cost would be only $5,452,098. When added to DHS’s other litigation
costs, the total would be $8,823,105.54, or roughly 13% of the agency’s
budget. Under either measure, the actual costs would almost certainly be
lower, as this analysis assumes that literally every asylum applicant would opt
to use a translator, that every one-hour interpretation session would cost the
“half-day” price, and that every asylum officer is fluent only in English. For
comparison, in Fiscal Year 2018, the EOIR, which likewise guarantees
interpretation services,177 conducted 89.69% of its hearings in languages
other than English.178 Looking outward to the United States Government’s
full, annual spending, the highest estimated figure, $14,471,675.50, would
have constituted roughly 0.0003% of the Government’s total spending in
2018.179
174

175

176

177

178
179

The
Affirmative Asylum
Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-process (last
visited Mar. 18, 2020); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BLANKET PURCHASE
AGREEMENT FOR COURT INTERPRETER SERVICES, available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/rateinfosheet.pdf (last accessed Mar. 18, 2020) (defining “half-day”).
This rate is consistent throughout all federal courts regardless of their location. ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, BLANKET PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR COURT INTERPRETER SERVICES,
available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rateinfosheet.pdf (last accessed Mar. 18,
2020).
EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADJUDICATION STATISTICS:
AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM APPLICATIONS (2020), available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/
file/1106361/download.
EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT
PRACTICE MANUAL (2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/
attachments/2017/11/02/practicemanual.pdf.
EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADJUDICATION STATISTICS
(2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248496/download.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE FEDERAL BUDGET IN 2018 (2019), https://www.cbo.gov/system/
files/2019-06/55342-2018-budget.pdf.
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As for burdens on administrative staff, assuming DHS would contract
with professional interpreters to meet the demands of due process, current
staff would not be burdened with new responsibilities in addition to their
current ones. If anything, guaranteeing interpretative services might take
pressure off of multilingual asylum officers who may currently be conducting
more interviews than their monolingual colleagues. Transaction costs are
likewise likely to be minimal, since this is not the first deal of this kind the
Government would be making, and the Government would be in a position
to negotiate for a long-term contract, so as to minimize future term
discussions. Moreover, if fewer asylum applications are erroneously denied
at the interview stage, IJs could expect to review fewer decisions, reducing
the overall size of their dockets.
D. Goldberg and the Court’s Commitment to Fostering Dignity
The Eldridge balancing test explicitly identifies three factors to consider in
determining what process is due.180 Professor Lucie White argues that
Goldberg, Eldridge’s predecessor, can be read to signify a fourth due-process
consideration: the Court’s interest in promoting a humanist vision of
procedural justice.181 Under this humanist vision, the Court’s decision in
Goldberg reflects “the Nation’s basic commitment to both substantive equality
and institutional innovation in participation opportunities, in order to foster
the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders.”182 Dignity is, of
course, an elusive concept.183 This Comment does not attempt to provide a
comprehensive legal definition. For the purposes of examining the specific
form of “dignity” associated with speaking one’s language of choice, this
Comment refers to the Court’s declaration in Obergefell v. Hodges:
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no State
shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

180
181
182
183

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 434 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.,
38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65).
See Jonathan Turley, Opinion, The Trouble with the ‘Dignity’ of Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST (July
2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-trouble-with-the-dignity-of-same-sex-m
arriage/2015/07/02/43bd8f70-1f4e-11e5-aeb9-a411a84c9d55_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_
term=.85339ec7bdb0 (“Dignity is a rather elusive and malleable concept compared with more
concrete qualities such as race and sex.”).
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law.” The fundamental liberties protected by this Clause . . . extend to
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs. 184

The Supreme Court thus defined “dignity” in Obergefell as including “intimate
choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”185
In line with this definition, sociolinguistic studies demonstrate that
individuals’ linguistic choices stem from a desire to convey information about
themselves and define their personal identities.186 In a study of an EnglishSpanish bilingual fourth-grade classroom, for example, the researcher noted
the following behaviors: (1) two girls whose best-friendship was grounded in
their shared bilingualism—the trait that distinguished them from the rest of
their friends—were more likely to engage in “code-switching”187 between
English and Spanish;188 (2) when the girls and boys of the classroom, as
groups, were involved in a disagreement, the girls spoke English to “separate”
themselves from the boys, who were arguing in Spanish;189 (3) a boy who took
clear pride in his Mexican heritage preferred using Spanish over English as
a means of expressing his Mexican identity;190 and (4) one of the most
studious children in the classroom would consistently use the language of
instruction, whether English or Spanish, as part of constructing his identity
of “good student.”191 Similar patterns have emerged in a range of other
contexts: gay men adjusting their speech so as not to sound “too gay” when
speaking to potentially homophobic audiences and instead invoking patterns
that are associated with education and authority,192 women lawyers
“neutralizing” their speech to sound indistinguishable from their male
colleagues,193 and young people of all ethnic backgrounds adopting features
184
185
186

187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).
Id.
The research in this area defines “social identity” as “the socially constructed membership in a
social group or category.” Janet M. Fuller, Language Choice as a Means of Shaping Identity, 17 J.
LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 105, 106 (2007); see, e.g., id. at 117 (“[I]t is commonplace for
bilinguals to use both of their languages with each other to index bilingual identity.”).
“Code-switching,” in this study, referred to “changes in language choice across speaker turns, for
example, when speaker A speaks Spanish and speaker B responds in English.” Id. at 105–06.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 124.
ROBERT J. PODESVA, SARAH J. ROBERTS & KATHRYN CAMPBELL-KIBLER, SHARING
RESOURCES AND INDEXING MEANINGS IN THE PRODUCTION OF GAY STYLES 186–87 (2001).
Bryna Bogoch, Gendered Lawyering: Difference and Dominance in Lawyer-Client Interaction, 31 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 677, 705 (1997).
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of “African-American Vernacular English” to express their affiliations with
“hip-hop culture,”194 to name a few.
Individual choices relating to speech thus are identity-driven and fall
within the ambit of “dignity” outlined in Obergefell. Consequently, when the
Government mandates, in the absence of a translator, that an applicant must
tell her story in English or not tell it at all, the United States is not acting in
accordance with Goldberg’s promise of “foster[ing] the dignity . . . of all
persons within its borders.”195 Much to the contrary, individuals who speak
English with an accent—that is, those who speak with less than
native/bilingual proficiency—actually perceive stigmatization.196 Perceiving
stigmatization in turn leads to more general concerns about their belonging
in the United States.197 In fact, perceived bias with regard to accent is such
a pervasive source of insecurity among American immigrants that those who
can afford it often seek help from speech pathologists—“they feel their choice
is between speech lessons or exclusion.”198 Thus, failing to provide
translation services to asylum seekers contradicts with the dignity interests
central to Goldberg’s fourth consideration: applicants who are unable to speak
in their language of choice are being deprived of an identity-driven choice—
a choice that falls within Obergefell’s ambit of “dignity.”199
194

195
196
197
198

199

Cecelia Cutler, Hip-Hop, White Immigrant Youth, and African American Vernacular English: Accommodation
as an Identity Choice, 38 J. ENG. LINGUISTICS 248, 251 (2010). African American Vernacular English,
or “AAVE,” is a linguistic term of art used to refer to “the range of variable patterns associated with
the speech of African Americans in the United States.” Id. at 265.
See White, supra note 182.
Agata Gluszek & John F. Dovidio, Speaking with a Nonnative Accent: Perceptions of Bias, Communication
Difficulties, and Belonging in the United States, 29 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 224, 227 (2010).
Id. at 228.
Raymond Hernandez, When an Accent Becomes an Issue: Immigrants Turn to Speech Classes to Reduce Sting
of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at B1, available at https://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/02/
nyregion/when-accent-becomes-issue-immigrants-turn-speech-classes-reduce-sting-bias.html.
It is worth noting that perceived stigmatization also correlates with conversational problems and
difficulties in communicating. See Gluszek & Dovidio, supra note 196, at 227. When an asylum
applicant is not given the opportunity to speak in the language of her choice, there is a risk that
perceived bias will render her too uncomfortable to tell her story in full. Cf. White, supra note 182,
at 44 (“The hearing appears to invite Mrs. G. to speak on equal terms with all other persons. Yet
within the local landscape of her hearing, Mrs. G.’s voice is constrained by forces that procedural
doctrine will neither acknowledge nor oppose. Each of these forces attaches a specific social cost to
her gender and race identity. The caste system implements race and gender ideology in social
arrangements. The ‘fraud issue’ revives misogynist and racist stereotypes that had been forced, at
least partly, underground by the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. And the welfare system
responds to gender and race-based injustice in the economy by construing the poor as Woman—
as an object of social control. Given the power amassed behind these forces, we might predict that
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CONCLUSION
Asylum applicants possess a liberty interest that triggers due-process
protections. When a Goldberg-Eldridge balancing analysis is conducted to
analyze what process, exactly, is due, the additional costs to the Government
of guaranteeing interpretative services to affirmative asylum seekers is
minimal, while asylum seekers’ interest in staying in this country is
significant. With regard to the second Eldridge factor and the risks associated
with erroneous deprivation, a denial of asylum can result in extreme hardship
for the applicant. As for added value, professional interpreters are more
effective than their untrained counterparts. Furthermore, where an
applicant would otherwise be unable to find even an untrained translator,
guaranteeing interpretive services could mean the difference between a grant
of asylum and a pre-interview dismissal of the claim. On the other side of
the balance, guaranteeing interpretation services to asylum applicants would
result in only minimal additional costs to the Government. Moreover,
guaranteeing interpretative services would preserve an identity-driven choice
for asylum applicants, which would be in line with the Court’s commitment
to fostering dignity in administrative adjudications. As such, the Court
should guarantee due-process protections to all non-citizens and guarantee
that those protections include translation services for non-citizens with
limited English proficiency.

they should win the contest with Mrs. G. for her voice.”). Thus, even individuals who are competent
in English may fail to provide the detail necessary to have a successful asylum application. This
risk strikes at due-process concerns presented in both the Goldberg and Eldridge decisions: Goldberg’s
commitment to fostering dignity and Eldridge’s concern about erroneous deprivation of benefits. See
White, supra note 182; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).

